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Abstract
Consequences of the basic and most evident consistency
requirement—that measured events cannot happen and not happen
at the same time—are shortly reviewed. Particular emphasis is given
to event forecast and event control. As a consequence, particular, very
general bounds on the forecast and control of events within the known
laws of physics result. These bounds are of a global, statistical nature
and need not affect singular events or groups of events.
Principle of self-consistency
An irreducible, atomic physical phenomenon manifests itself as a click of
some detector. There can either be a click or there can be no click. This
yes-no scheme is experimental physics in-a-nutshell (at least according to a
theoretician). From that kind of elementary observation, all of our physical
evidence is accumulated.
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Such irreversibly observed events (whatever the relevance or meaning of
those terms are [1, 2, 3, 4]) are subject to the primary condition of consistency
or self-consistency: “Any particular irreversibly observed event either happens
or does not happen, but it cannot both happen and not happen.”
Indeed, so trivial seems the requirement of consistency that David Hilbert
polemicised against “another author” with the following words [5], “...for me,
the opinion that the [[physical]] facts and events themselves can be contra-
dictory is a good example of thoughtlessness.”
Just as in mathematics, inconsistency, i.e., the coexistence of truth and
falseness of propositions, is a fatal property of any physical theory. Nev-
ertheless, in a certain very precise sense, quantum mechanics incorporates
inconsistencies in a very subtle way, which assures overall consistency. For
instance, a particle wave function or quantum state is said to “pass” a double
slit through both slits at once, which is classically impossible. (Such consid-
erations may, however, be considered as mere trickery quantum talk, devoid
of any operational meaning.) Yet, neither a particle wave function nor quan-
tum states are directly associable with any sort of irreversible observed event
of physical reality. We shall come back to a particular quantum case in the
second part of this investigation.
And just as in mathematics and in formal logic it can be argued that
too strong capacities of intrinsic event forecast and intrinsic event control
renders the system overall inconsistent. This fact may indeed be considered
as one decisive feature in finite deterministic (“algorithmic”) models [6]. It
manifests itself already in the early stages of Cantorian set theory: any claim
that it is possible to enumerate the real numbers yields, via the diagonaliza-
tion method, to an outright contradiction. The only consistent alternative is
the acceptance that no such capacity of enumeration exists. Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorem [7] states that any formal system rich enough to include
arithmetic and elementary logic could not be both consistent and complete.
Turing’s theorem on the recursive unsolvability of the halting problem [8], as
well as Chaitin’s Ω numbers [9] are formalizations of related limitations in
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formal logics, the computer sciences and mathematics.
In what follows we shall proceed along very similar lines. We shall first
argue that any capacity of total forecast or event control—even in a totally
deterministic environment—is contradicting the (idealistic) idea that deci-
sions between alternatives are possible; stated differently: that there is free
will. Then we shall proceed with possibilities of forecast and event control
which are consistent both with free will and the known laws of physics.
It is also clear that some form of forecast and event control is evidently
possible—indeed, that is one of the main achievements of contemporary nat-
ural science, and we make everyday use of it, say, by switching on the light.
These capacities derived from the standard natural sciences are characterized
by a high chance of reproducibility, and therefore do not depend on single
events.
In what follows, we shall concentrate on very general bounds of capacities
of forecast and event control; bounds which are imposed upon them by the
requirement of consistency. These considerations should be fairly general
and do not depend on any particular physical model. They are valid for all
conceivable forms of physical theories; classical, quantum and forthcoming
alike.
Strong forecasting
Let us consider forecasting the future first. Even if physical phenomena occur
deterministically and can be accounted for (”computed”) on a higher level
of abstraction, from within the system such a complete description may not
be of much practical, operational use [10, 11].
Indeed, suppose there exists free will. Suppose further that an agent
could predict all future events, without exceptions. We shall call this the
strong form of forecasting. In this case, the agent could freely decide to
counteract in such a way as to invalidate that prediction. Hence, in order to
avoid inconsistencies and paradoxes, either free will has to be abandoned, or
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it has to be accepted that complete prediction is impossible.
Another possibility would be to consider strong forms of forecasting which
are, however, not utilized to alter the system. Effectively, this results in the
abandonment of free will, amounting to an extrinsic, detached viewpoint.
After all, what is knowledge and what is it good for if it cannot be applied
and made to use?
It should be mentioned that the above argument is of an ancient type [12].
As has already been mentioned, it has been formalized recently in set theory,
formal logic and recursive function theory, where it is called “diagonalization
method.”
In doing this, we are inspired by the recent advances in the foundations of
quantum (information) theory. There, due to complementarity and the im-
possibility to clone generic states, single events may have important meanings
to some observers, although they make no sense at all to other observers. One
example for this is quantum cryptography. Many of these events are stochas-
tic and are postulated to satisfy all conceivable statistical laws (correlations
are nonclassical, though). In such frameworks, high degrees of reproducibility
cannot be guaranteed, although single events may carry valuable information,
which can even be distilled and purified.
Strong event control
A very similar argument holds for event control and the production of “mira-
cles” [13]. Suppose there exists free will. Suppose further that an agent could
entirely control the future. We shall call this the strong form of event control.
Then this observer could freely decide to invalidate the laws of physics. In
order to avoid a paradox, either free will or some physical laws would have
to be abandoned, or it has to be accepted that complete event control is
impossible.
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Weak forecast and event control
From what has already been said, it should be clear that it is reasonable to
assume that forecast and event control should be possible only if this capacity
cannot be associated with any paradox or contradiction.
Thus the requirement of consistency of the phenomena seems to impose
rather stringent conditions on forecasting and event control. Similar ideas
have already been discussed in the context of time paradoxes in relativity
theory (cf. [14] and [15, p. 272], “The only solutions to the laws of physics
that can occur locally . . . are those which are globally self-consistent”).
There is, however, a possibility that the forecast and control of future
events is conceivable for singular events within the statistical bounds. Such
occurrences may be “singular miracles” which are well accountable within
the known laws of physics. They will be called weak forms of forecasting and
event control.
It may be argued that, in order to obey overall consistency, such a frame-
work should not be extendable to any forms of strong forecast or event con-
trol, because, as has been argued before, this could either violate global
consistency criteria or would make necessary a revision of the known laws of
physics.
The relevant laws of statistics (e.g., all recursively enumerable
ones) impose rather lax constraints especially on finite sequences and
do not exclude local, singular, improbable events. For example,
a binary sequence such as 11111111111111111111111111111111 is just
as probable as the sequences 11100101110101000111000011010101 and
01010101010101010101010101010101 and its occurrence in a test is equally
likely, although the “meaning” an observer could ascribe to it is rather dif-
ferent. These sequences may be embedded in and be part of much longer
stochastic sequences. If short finite regular (or “meaningful”) sequences are
padded into long irregular (“meaningless”) ones, those sequences become
statistically indistinguishable for all practical purposes from the previous
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sequences. Of course, the “meaning” of any such sequence may vary with
different observers. Some of them may be able to decipher a sequence, others
may not be capable of this capacity.
It is quite evident that per definition any finite regularity in an other-
wise stochastic environment should exclude the type of high reproducability
which one has gotten used to in the natural sciences. Just on the contrary:
single “meaningful” events which are hardly reproducible might indicate a
new category of phenomena which is dual to the usual “lawful” and highly
predictable ones.
Just as it is perfectly all right to consider the statement “This statement
is true” to be true, it may be perfectly reasonable to speculate that certain
events are forecasted and controlled within the domain of statistical laws.
But in order to be within the statistical laws, any such method needs not to
be guaranteed to work at all times.
To put it pointedly: it may be perfectly reasonable to become rich, say,
by singular forecasts of the stock and future values or in horse races, but such
an ability must necessarily be not extendible, irreproducible and secretive; at
least to such an extend that no guarantee of an overall strategy and regularity
can be derived from it.
The associated weak forms of forecasting and event control are thus be-
yond any global statistical significance. Their importance and meaning seems
to lie mainly on a very subjective level of singular events. This comes close
to one aspect of what Jung imagined as the principle of “synchronicity” [16],
and is dual to the more reproducible forms one is usually accustomed to.
Against the odds
This final paragraph reviews a couple of experiments which suggest them-
selves in the context of weak forecast and event control. All are based on the
observation whether or not an agent is capable to forecast or control correctly
future events such as, say, the tossing of a fair coin.
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In the first run of the experiment, no consequence is derived from the
agent’s capacity despite the mere recording of the data.
The second run of the experiment is like the first run, but the meaning of
the forecasts or controlled events are different. They are taken as outcomes
of, say gambling, against other individuals (i) with or (ii) without similar
capacities, or against (iii) an anonymous “mechanic” agent such as a casino
or a stock exchange.
As a variant of this experiment, the partners or adversaries of the agent
are informed about the agent’s intentions.
In the third run of experiments, the experimenter attempts to counteract
the agent’s capacity. Let us assume the experimenter has total control over
the event. If the agent predicts or attempts to bring about to happen a
certain future event, the experimenter causes the event not to happen and
so on.
It might be interesting to record just how much the agent’s capacity is
changed by the setup. Such an expectation might be defined from a di-
chotomic observable
e(A, i) =


+1 correct guess
−1 incorrect guess
where i stands for the i’th experiment and A stands for the agent A. An
expectation function can then be defined as usual by the average over N
experiments; i.e.,
E(A) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
e(A, i).
From the first to the second type of experiment it should become more
and more unlikely that the agent operates correctly, since his performance
is leveled against other agents with more or less the same capacities. The
third type of experiment should produce a total anticorrelation. Formally,
this should result in a decrease of E when compared to the first round of
experiment.
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Another, rather subtle, deviation from the probabilistic laws may be ob-
served if correlated events are considered. Just as in the case of quantum
entanglement, it may happen that individual components of correlated sys-
tems may behave totally at random exhibit more disorder than the system
as a whole [17].
If once again one assumes two dichotomic observables e(A, i), e(B, i) of a
correlated subsystem, then the correlation function
C(A,B) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
e(A, i)e(B, i)
and the associated probabilities may give rise to violations of the Boole-
Bell inequalities—Boole’s “conditions of possible [[classical]] experience”
[18, 19, 20, 21] and may even exceed [22] the Tsirelson bounds [23, 24, 25]
for “conditions of possible [[quantum]] experience.” There, the agent should
concentrate on influencing the coincidences of the event rather than the sin-
gle individual events. In such a case, the individual observables may behave
perfectly random, while the associated correlations might be nonclassical and
even stronger-than-quantum and might give rise to highly nonlocal phenom-
ena. As long as the individual events cannot be controlled, this needs not
even violate Einstein causality. (But even then, consistent scenarios remain
[26].)
In summary it can be stated that, although total forecasting and event
control are incompatible with free will, more subtle forms of these capacities
remain conceivable even beyond the present laws of physics; at least as long as
their effects upon the “fabric of phenomena” are consistent. These capacities
are characterized by singular events and not on the reproducible patterns
which are often encountered under the known laws of physics. Whether or not
such capacities exist at all remains an open question. Nevertheless, despite
the elusiveness of the phenomenology involved, it appears not unreasonable
that the hypothesis might be testable, operationalizable and even put to use
in certain contexts.
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